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When Dr. Havelburg, Assistant Surgeon in the United States Marine Hospital Service, 
accepted his new assignment in October 1899, it is hard to imagine he did not feel at least some 
measure of fear in regard to what he was about to undertake. Although the bubonic plague had 
resurfaced in the 1860’s and by the end of the century spread throughout China and India, 
Havelburg had now been tasked to investigate rumors that the plague had appeared half way 
around the globe, on the South American Continent. As he traveled to Brazil, perhaps he thought 
of the previous plague pandemics which shaped so much of human history. Whether it was the 
Byzantine Emperor Justinian escaping the disease with his life, only to see 50 million people in 
his empire and beyond die at its hands; whether it was the estimated 60 percent of the European 
population that died due to the disease in the Middle Ages; or whether it was the thousands of 
people who had already died in India and China, it was after all, in part, up to Havelburg to 
prevent this outbreak from being as catastrophic as the previous two. Yet Dr. Havelburg was not 
working alone, he was an agent of the United States Marine Hospital Service and reported 
directly back to the Surgeon General Walter Wyman. Founded in 1789 to provide healthcare and 
funding for Marine Hospitals and servicemen in the United States Navy, the Marine Hospital 
Service’s function was expanded under the National Quarantine act of 1878 making it one of the 
first nationally oriented public health organizations in the United States. As the U.S.M.H.S. 
would eventually become the current Public Health Service (PHS), by the year 1899, it was 
already the predominant organization in the United States working to prevent the spread of 
disease.  
Yet, the turn of the century saw the disease manifest itself in new ways and neither 
Havelburg, the M.H.S., or any other public health organization were able to prevent the third 
global pandemic of bubonic plague in human history. While the death toll in the United states 
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remained relatively low by comparison—despite notable outbreaks in San Francisco and the 
recently-annexed Hawaiian Islands—the entire world was forced to combat the historically 
devastating disease in new locations and with new techniques. Due to the increasingly global and 
industrialized world economy, both the spread and containment of disease became not only 
harder to monitor, but increasingly required cooperation between different groups of health-
related officials. As in much of human history, port cities in 1899, with their chaotic nature and 
high traffic, were natural hotbeds for disease and Santos, Brazil was no exception. As Havelburg 
arrived by steamer to accomplish his mission, he would soon learn that so too had the plague.  
Despite the fact that Brazilian officials had declared the presence of plague in Santos a 
week earlier, Havelburg’s initial report from October 25 was hesitant. After studying the reports 
of many of the local physicians and officials, he eventually telegrammed “On further 
investigation I find the official reports are unreliable. From information received I should say 
think you had better wait further information.”i By the time his next report arrived at the M.H.S. 
on December 14, there would be no doubt regarding the plague at Santos, and Havelburg would 
find himself caught up in the midst of a national controversy. 
On October 18, 1899, the same day that the municipal government of Santos officially 
confirmed the presence of plague in their city, Robert Hope was discharged from the local 
hospital in Santos. When he arrived in Santos on the steamship the J.W. Taylor only a few days 
earlier, he had been involuntary admitted to the hospital by Dr. Moura Ribeiro who feared Hope 
might be sick with plague. Dr. Ribeiro, held three medical positions: he was the visiting doctor 
of Robert Hope’s employer, the shipping agents Lamport & Holt; he was the managing physician 
at the municipal hospital; and he was a member of the local sanitary commission investigating 
the possible outbreak of bubonic plague in Santos. Whether Ribeiro’s insistence that Hope be 
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hospitalized was due to genuine concern, to his own personal interest, or rather to some 
combination of the two, the timing of Hope’s discharge was ironic as it would not be long before 
he was truly sick. 
In order to receive hospital leave, Hope initially reported to Lamport & Holt that he was 
suffering from syphilis, however after his discharge the next week, Ribeiro’s notes would instead 
detail the presence of eczema on Hope’s face and lips. Regardless of what ailed Robert Hope on 
his arrival in Santos, on October 18, 1899, he was deemed healthy enough to return to work. Six 
days later he re-boarded the J.W. Taylor and set sail for New York City. Serving as the 
steamship’s steward, Hope’s duties consisted of maintaining and operating the living and dining 
quarters for the captain and crew.  
On November 2, when Hope began to experience pain in his head, legs and back, Captain 
Waters and the ship’s cook, realized immediately that he was seriously ill.1 The pair were left 
with little to do but nurse the young Englishman after he developed a fever the following day and 
even after they had utilized “the full extent of the onboard medicine cupboard”ii, Hope’s 
condition continued to worsen. As Hope was rendered immobile with exhaustion, headache, and 
fever, his groin and underarms began to swell, resulting in the ominous buboes characteristic of 
“the black death.” On November 7, Robert Hope died and was buried at sea. Within two weeks, 
millions of Americans would read about Hope’s death. His name would appear on the front 
pages of newspapers in Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco and New York and many medical 
professionals would argue about the circumstances surrounding his death. 
                                                 
1 The cook of The J.W. Taylor is consistently referred to by different names in different 
accounts. The two most common names are Robert Burns and Charles J. Allison. 
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Hope, however, would not be the only subject central to the controversy that his death 
would create. The day after his burial, both the cook and Captain Waters began to exhibit similar 
symptoms and upon reaching the New York Harbor on November 18, the J.W. Taylor presented 
the yellow flag to indicate the need for quarantine. Despite the many physicians and officials 
there that day to meet the Taylor, as well as the many plans they had drawn up for similar 
scenarios, the presence of the Taylor in the New York Harbor over the next month would 
challenge numerous assumptions about the practice and ideology of public health at the turn of 
the century. In particular, the infamous steamship would provide basis for which to discuss the 
standards and procedures by which the rapidly developing field of public health would operate. 
Additionally, not all of those waiting for the arrival of the Taylor were medical 
professionals. Journalists were also waiting at the harbor that day and would continue to be 
present at nearly every significant turn in the Taylor’s story. Consequentially, they would greatly 
affect both the contemporary understanding of the ship’s presence in the New York Harbor as 
well as the greater historical legacy of the resulting controversy. Ultimately, the importance and 
influence of this reporting would highlight the changing structures of public health in a world 
where both information and commercial goods were circulating at an ever-increasing pace. 
Moreover, this ongoing construction of the Taylor’s narrative would indicate a larger 
conversation surrounding the tensions and limitations of existing public health systems, 
particularly when opinions held by the general public clashed with the opinions of medical 
professionals. 
On November 18, a small contingent of medical officials sailed to meet the newly-arrived 
J.W. Taylor. Due to Havelburg’s reports of the plague in Santos, health and quarantine officials 
across the United States were notably suspicious of travelers and cargo from Brazil. When Dr. 
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L’Hommedieu, the health officer on duty at the Port of New York, saw the yellow quarantine 
flag on the ship from Santos, a part of him must have felt a moment of terror considering the 
legacy of death and destruction that potentially floated in front of him. To further complicate Dr. 
L’Hommedieu’s situation, he was not the ranking medical official at the Port of New York. His 
boss, Dr. A.H. Doty, Health Officer of the New York Port, was in Europe.  
Although reports differ in competing papers, L’Hommedieu was met on the ships deck by 
Captain Waters. Some reports suggest Waters was in a great deal of pain while others suggest 
Waters had already passed the most severe part of his illness. Reported in The New York 
Journal, after being informed of his necessary detention due to suspected plague, the brave 
Captain gritted his teeth and spoke through the pain, “Yes, I know all about it. I have it now 
myself and the steward died of it on the way north.”iii Regardless of the veracity of this scene, 
unanimously reported was L’Hommedieu’s inspection of both the cook and captain. On each of 
them he discovered the same ominous symptoms that had afflicted Robert Hope, pronounced 
swelling of the glands in the legs and armpits. With evidence suggesting what he perhaps 
expected, and certainly feared, L’Hommedieu promptly declared an official quarantine of the 
J.W. Taylor. He dared not risk with the lives of New York City’s three and a half million people. 
 The initial quarantine that L’Hommedieu declared could be most basically understood as 
three straightforward steps that had previously been prepared by his absent boss, Dr. Doty. First, 
the confirmation of disease by an outside source; second, the detention of the diseased persons 
and crew; and third, the disinfection of the ship. To confirm the infection of Waters and the cook, 
Doctors Lawrence and Park from the New York Board of Health arrived at the Taylor later that 
afternoon. The two physicians extracted samples from the suspected sailors and using 
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hypodermic needles to aspirate their lymph nodes, they drew fluid from the many swollen 
buboes. 
The samples were immediately sent to the laboratory in order to confirm the presence of 
plague bacillus while the two infected sailors, having been re-examined, were subsequently 
transported to Swinburne Island. One of two small artificial islands built off of the eastern coast 
of Staten Island, Swinburne had been created in the late nineteenth century as a specific 
quarantine facility for people suffering from contagious diseases. The other island, Hoffman 
Island, would later be the destination for the other sixteen crew members who were required to 
stay at a detention center for the duration of eight days in order to make sure they did not 
develop symptoms similar to those of their cook and captain. The Taylor itself was to later be 
subjected to a rigorous 3-day fumigation consisting of steam, sulphur and mercury.2  
Finally, Dr. L’Hommedieu would initiate the final part of the official quarantine protocol 
by assembling an advisory board that the ranking health officer—Dr. Doty— had appointed 
several years earlier. Consisting of some of New York’s leading physicians, the board would 
gather as a means of internally reviewing, conducting and advising on the quarantine. As 
L’Hommedieu and Doty’s second in command, Dr. E.B. Sanborn, reported on the morning’s 
findings to the advisory board, a statement was soon issued from the group. The statement read, 
“In reference to the cases of bubonic plague said to be present at quarantine station, the nature of 
the disease seems to be established by the history of the cases and the evidence that the plague 
exists at Santos. Under the circumstances the committee deems it wise to provide for the removal 
of the sick to Swinburne Island and the well to Hoffman Island, and the discharge of the cargo 
                                                 
2 Information of the quarantine protocol is taken from Geddings report to the M.H.S.  
 
Geddings, H. D. "Plague on the Steamship J. W. Taylor at New York Quarantine." Public Health Reports (1896-
1970) 14, no. 49 (1899): 
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under the strictest sanitary precautions, while the ship itself shall be held in quarantine. In the 
opinion of the committee there is absolutely no reason for alarm.”iv Despite the measured and 
consistent tone struck in the statement, one member of the advisory commission was noticeably 
less satisfied with the precautions set into place that day.  
 Dr. John B. Cosby, of the New York Board of Health separately addressed the gathered 
the reporters at the end of the advisory meeting and in turn, expressed several much stronger 
opinions about the ship’s quarantine. Cosby began his statement by explaining the process of 
examining bacteria samples to the gathered reporters. Optimistically stating the samples would 
prove to be decisive by the following day, Cosby further explained that the quarantined crew 
members would be detained at Hoffman Island for the duration of the plague’s incubation period, 
roughly eight to ten days. But Cosby’s accommodating tone soon took a noticeable turn. 
Whether pressured by reporters, expressing his personal beliefs, or attempting to project the 
power and confidence of his position, Cosby went on to stress that although the Taylor’s cargo 
may be allowed to be landed under the quarantine protocol, the ship itself would by no means be 
allowed to enter the port. Making his position even more explicit he stressed the city would be 
protected “no matter what the cost,” going so far as to suggest the possibility of burning the 
Taylor’s cargo.v Evidenced by the high number of articles that would include Cosby’s comments 
the next day, reporters distinctly employed the doctor’s interview as means of adding drama to 
the comparatively restrained statement of the advisory committee. As the James W. Wadsworth, 
a tugboat designed to steam and fumigate quarantined vessels, sailed out to the New York 
Harbor that night to begin its work, newspapers across the country were finalizing their edits and 
printing the next day’s issues, many of which had the J.W. Taylor on the front page.  
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 The headlines shared a common thread: the element of fear. The Los Angeles Times read 
“DREAD BUBONIC PLAGUE.” Similar was the Chicago Daily Tribune: “PLAGUE IS IN 
NEW YORK,” and finally The New York Times which read: “FEAR THE PLAGUE IS HERE.” 
Oddly, one of the more inflammatory articles from November 19, was published with one of the 
least sensational headlines. “BUBONIC PLAGUE STOPPED AT NEW YORK’S GATE” was 
printed in bold capital letters in the upper left-hand corner of William Randolph Hearst’s New 
York Journal and Advertiser, making it the lead article of that day. A paper that would come to 
be emblematic of the sensational Yellow Journalism of the period, The New York Journal also 
offered the most detailed report of the Taylor’s arrival that day. Containing many details unique 
to its own report— such as the dramatic first encounter between L’Hommedieu and Captain 
Waters—The New York Journal also printed, in bold, a portion of Cosby’s strong statement that 
followed the advisory meeting. The statement reads, “But after the ship is released from 
quarantine, she comes under the jurisdiction of the municipal health authorities. You may state to 
the public that under no circumstances will this ship be allowed to land, or to approach a dock of 
New York City. I intend that the people of this city shall be protected. That is the paramount 
duty, and it will be performed, whether the cost is two dollars or two million dollars. If it is 
considered necessary the ship will be burned.” He continued, “The British medical authorities in 
India since the outbreak of the plague there have burned villages and towns as the only certain 
way of destroying the germs of the disease. I want the newspapers to tell the people that we 
honestly believe there is absolutely no danger that the disease will get into New York. And I 
repeat no matter what the cost, no matter what measures may be necessary, the people will be 
protected. If there are no precedents to guide our action then we will make precedents.”vi  
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Cosby’s statement was, without a doubt, afforded the most editorial significance in the 
article, as it effectively acted as the piece’s conclusion. Compared to another lengthy report from 
The New York Times, a reader of the Journal could easily have assumed that Cosby, in fact, was 
in charge of the quarantine process. Moreover, the report in The New York Times seemed to 
stress the actions of a different health official, the temporarily absent Dr. A.H. Doty, Health 
Officer of the Port of New York. In noticeable contrast to The New York Journal, The Times led 
their article by emphasizing the immense preparation that the quarantine protocol represented, 
stressing that the actions being taken to quarantine the Taylor had been determined years in 
advance by quarantine and harbor officials, all experts in their field. Although including a much-
reduced version of Cosby’s quotes, The Times article concluded with a segment recounting Dr. 
Doty’s previous scholarship regarding plague and quarantine. Hailing it as extensive and 
carefully planned, a clear impression was given that Doty was the architect of a thorough and 
careful quarantine, specifically calculated for this exact moment.vii The sentiment was shared by 
the Chicago Daily Tribune, which offered another of the more extensive reports. Similarly 
focused on Doty’s scholarship and preparedness, the Nov. 19 article prominently displayed the 
full statement of the advisory committee concluding with the optimistic statement of New York 
Physician M. J. Lewis. Stating, “The public need not be alarmed. Watchfulness is necessary and 
the excellent quarantine methods in vogue in this country will stop the disease. The appearance 
of the disease in this harbor, will however be a warning to the health officials at every port of 
entry in the country and it is not probable the disease will obtain a foothold here.”viii History 
would sadly prove Dr. Lewis wrong as the plague would indeed reach the United States at the 
beginning of the 20th century notably ravaging poor immigrant communities in San Francisco. 
Nevertheless, Lewis’s statement reflects both the growing confidence and evolving significance 
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of the American public health structures of the period, sentiments that are further visible in the 
preparation of Dr. Doty’s quarantine protocol and the New York Times complementary support 
of his strategy. 
At all events, by the end of the J.W. Taylor’s second day in the Harbor of New York, the 
entire country was aware of its presence, knew the names of the crew members and perhaps most 
importantly, generally understood the process of their quarantine. Although citizens from all 
corners of society would undoubtedly hold their own discussions as to the appropriate quarantine 
of the Taylor, perceptible readers in New York would notice similar debates beginning to form in 
much more public channels as well. The noticeable difference in reporting by the New York 
Times and the New York Journal in particular, illustrated a small yet potentially significant 
question as to the authority and very nature of the quarantine: was it to progress according to the 
structurally oriented, bureaucratic plans of A.H. Doty? Or was it to be subject to judgment and 
procedure of a more unilateral nature, through the authorities of the Board of Health?  Reports on 
the following day reiterated what was at stake in the way this question would be answered.  
The next day on Nov. 20, the presence of plague bacteria in the crew was confirmed and 
reported in nearly every national paper. Although the samples taken by Dr. Park contained 
currently dead bacteria, the bacteriologist clarified that it was quite possible for the bacteria to 
contaminate other areas of the ship, and even become active again in certain conditions. As this 
scientific proof underscored the veritable threat that the Taylor and the bubonic plague posed to 
the city, newspapers proceeded to contextualize this information in different ways. The Times 
chose an international approach, detailing the spread of plague in Latin America with specific 
focus on Santos. Recounting the investigations of Assistant Surgeon Havelburg, the article 
reported the spread of the plague, from Portugal to Rio de Janeiro and finally Santos. The Los 
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Angeles Times described for its readers the specific stages of disinfection that lay ahead for the 
Taylor. Explaining the corroboration process of the bacteriological exam, the article detailed the 
process by which the cargo was to be gradually offloaded, disinfected and finally landed. Finally, 
the article returned to the position of Health Commissioner Cosby, who again stated that 
regardless of the quarantine procedures, the Taylor was not to be allowed into the New York 
Harbor under any circumstances due to his fear that rats would escape the ship and spread the 
disease. Considering this, the headline found in The New York Journal which read “Rats on the 
Plague Ship Must Be Destroyed” can, characteristically, be viewed as an endorsement of 
Cosby’s claims.   
The Journal article itself focused solely on Cosby’s comments, affording only one 
mention of the disinfection process near the conclusion. The article also marks the first use of the 
sensational re-naming of the J.W. Taylor as “The Plague Ship.” A term which would be 
consistently used to reference the Taylor from that moment forward. Yet for many, the danger 
posed by “The Plague Ship,” likely seemed difficult to equate with the many reports coming 
from Swinburne Island. Dr. Sanborn, who had made a personal visit to the quarantine hospital 
just the day before, was happy to find both Captain Waters and the cook walking about the 
facility in high spirits. In fact, even in the very same article which christened the J.W. Taylor as 
“The Plague Ship,” The New York Journal could not refrain from reporting Captain Waters 
“promenade” around the facility, noting that even the cook could not refrain from joining this 
demonstration of good health. Evident in this article is a shift in in the narrative of the J.W. 
Taylor. As the disinfection began and the ill crew members began to show signs of improvement, 
the heart of the issue soon became about something new altogether. The focus had been shifted 
to the cargo—consisting of unroasted coffee beans—as it potentially posed the greatest 
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remaining threat to the city. Yet it quickly became apparent to many people that in some ways, 
quarantining cargo could be more complicated than quarantining people.  
The most immediate difference between quarantining the two subjects is the space 
required. Similar to the dire consequences of hospitals or other medical facilities becoming over-
crowded, in the case of the Taylor, considerable danger laid in the chance the quarantine area 
would become over-crowded. The next day on November 21, a German steamer, the Taormina 
arrived from Rio de Janeiro, a city also suffering from an outbreak of the plague. It too was 
subject to the extensive quarantine process Doty had devised. Considering plague existed and 
was spread on a bacteriological level, not only did the physical surfaces of these ships need to be 
disinfected, but so too did the crews clothing and any other textiles or materials that could 
potentially support the bacteria. Most significantly for the sake of the Taylor’s quarantine 
process, this required the bags that held the coffee itself to be burned. In total, there were 44,613 
bags of coffee on the Taylor, a number that regardless of the weight of the bag, would require 
immense work and caution to complete.ix In order to accomplish this, the coffee was first to be 
unloaded upon a series of lighters, or small barges, that would remain with the Taylor in 
quarantine. Although the unroasted coffee beans themselves were not viewed as risk of 
contamination, as a precautionary measure the beans were exposed to the open air as means of 
disinfection, receiving “open air and sunlight by day” and in the cold November nights, 
temperatures close to freezing.x While empty, the large cargo hold of the ship was to be 
subjected to sulphur fumigations daily. Finally, the living apartments, cabin and forecastle were 
all cleaned with Sulphur and a “corrosive sublimate solution” while the ship’s bedding, clothes 
and all textiles were subjected to steam disinfection. After the several days, it took to complete 
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the disinfecting process, the ship and lighters were to be left guarded and anchored outside of the 
New York Harbor for at least eight to ten days as to outlast the incubation period of the disease.  
Despite the extensive measures taken to disinfect the ship, ultimately neither Doty or any 
other health officials would have any certain way of knowing if the sum of the disinfection 
techniques had worked. As Doty and the other health officers of the port were attempting to 
prevent the spread of arguably the most dangerous and feared diseases known to mankind, even 
the slightest lingering doubt in the minds of the quarantine officials or the public could prove to 
cause serious panic. Such doubts were on full display on the front page of the New York Journal 
the following day. 
On Nov. 21, the same day the Taormina arrived and was quarantined, the ideological 
lines that had subtly divided the coverage of the J.W. Taylor between The New York Times and 
The New York Journal exploded into possibly their most blatant difference in reporting yet. Far 
from the headlines on the 7th page, The Times ran small article titled “No Fear of Bubonic 
Plague.” Printing the statements of Quarantine Official Dr. L’Hommeadieu regarding the quick 
recovery of both Captain Waters and the cook, the short article reported their recovery and good 
health, interpreting that the dead plague bacteria found in both crew members indicated that the 
plague had run its course. Conversely, jumping out from the opinion page of The New York 
Journal were the large block letters which read “Burn That Coffee.” The editorial argued that the 
entire cargo of the Taylor should be burned in order to eliminate any trace of the disease without 
a doubt. Suggesting that Doty’s policy of burning only the bags themselves was nowhere near 
safe enough, the piece presented an economic argument that the value of the coffee would be a 
small price to pay for any amount of greater damage caused by the plague. Citing the calculated 
millions of dollars that England had spent combating the plague in India in recent years, the 
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piece further concludes that the value of the lost coffee should be reimbursed by the public, as it 
would be considered a part of the price of protecting the greater population. The editorial 
concluded with the biting remarks, “If the coffee is allowed to be landed it will be mixed with 
the general stock in the market, and nobody will know when he may be having some of it on his 
table. Most people do not care to drink coffee from plague ships, however thoroughly it may 
have been fumigated. If there are any officials who feel differently, let them supply their own 
tables from the hold of the J.W. Taylor as a guarantee of good faith.”xi As the official in question 
was certainly a reference to Dr. Doty, the completely contradicting tones struck by the two New 
York papers on that day begin to highlight the many growing complexities in the quarantine of 
the Taylor.  
Although the Journal article certainly takes aim at Doty and thus, the process and 
structures of the quarantine, the editorial also tellingly strikes a populist tone, which places the 
collective good of the city over any business, bureaucratic, or private interests that would have 
been influencing the quarantine. But with its populist sentiment, how did The Journal expect to 
change the quarantine process, making sure that at all the costs, the ship would be prevented 
from entering the harbor? The answer appeared in an article published on the next day, Nov. 22 
with the subheading “Health Board has Sharp Eyes on the J. W. Taylor.” 
The president of the New York Board of Health was Michael C. Murphy, a figure who 
likely was likely known by a large part of the city population due to his long career in service to 
the state of New York. Fighting with the several New York Infantries in the Civil War, he 
received the Medal of Honor for his valor shown at the Battle of The North Anna River in 1863. 
After the war, Murphy served terms in both the New York State Assembly followed by terms in 
the New York State Senate as well. In 1898, Mayor Robert van Wyck appointed Murphy to the 
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post of President of the Board of Health where he remained until 1902 when he then assumed the 
first ever position as New York Police Commissioner. On the matter of the Taylor, Murphy, who 
was not a doctor— “civilians” were customarily appointed to lead the Board of Health—offered 
an opinion very similar to his colleague from the quarantine advisory committee, Dr. John 
Cosby, who was The Journal’s first featured voice for outspoken commentary. President Murphy 
expressed dissatisfaction with the proposed quarantine procedures and reiterated the prevailing 
line coming from the Board of Health: that they were prepared “to take whatever action 
necessary” to protect New York from “the plague ship.” Murphy’s involvement in the quarantine 
not only began the most controversial chapter of the ship’s stay outside of the New York Harbor 
but further corresponds to a crucial time in the Taylor’s story. As the disinfection of the cabins 
and main rooms of the ship had been completed by the sanitation tug Wadsworth in the previous 
days, the coffee had not begun its transfer to lighters and neither had the healthy crew been 
transferred to Hoffmann Island. Further explained in The Journal’s latest article, was the new 
proposal by Dr. Sanborn, the current ranking member of the Port of New York’s quarantine 
officials in the absence of Dr. Doty, to disinfect the steamers cargo by steam, rather than 
continue with the process of offloading it to lighters. The Journal attributed this change in 
protocol to inquiries by the coffee’s buyers as to when they were to receive the products they had 
already advanced money for. Although the article insisted those who purchased the coffee were 
banks, the actual purchaser of the coffee was the Arbuckle Brothers company, an early leader in 
the industry of roasting, grinding, and selling pre-packaged coffee. Nevertheless, the Journal was 
reasonable in assuming Sanborn’s proposal was likely connected in some part to pressure from 
Arbuckle Brothers to either receive their coffee or to make sure that the product was not spoiled 
in the process of the quarantine. Ultimately then, this moment provided a notable moment in the 
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quarantine of the Taylor, which saw new external pressures emerge both through the populist 
sentiments of Murphy and the Board of Health as well as the pressure of private business as 
expressed by the pressure from Arbuckle Brothers as well as Dr. Sanborn’s reconsideration of 
protocol. 
Several days would pass without news of the Taylor. On Nov. 24 a small summary in The 
Journal would again emphasize Murphy’s position of denying the Taylor within the New York 
Harbor. Yet, later that day, the unloading of the coffee would commence, signaling the 
continuation of the quarantine and the decision of Sanborn to follow Doty’s original plan despite 
pressure from the private sector. The following day, The Times would similarly run a small 
article detailing the involvement of the Marine Hospital Service and their evaluation of the 
quarantine. In a fashion consistent with past Times reports, the article would optimistically 
suggest that the Taylor would be permitted to land within the next week, allowing for the 
offloading of its coffee. The Board of Health responded with one its fiercest rebuttals yet, 
coordinating a joint statement with officials from New Jersey County Board of Health, the 
Hoboken Board of Health and officials from Perth Amboy and Bayonne, New Jersey, all echoing 
Murphy’s statement that the J.W. Taylor would not be allowed to land at their respective ports.xii 
Their statements were printed next to a printed and hand-drawn portrait of Murphy in the Nov. 
27 issue of The Journal. Notable was the manner in which the many statements from the 
surrounding health boards were aligned against various supporters of Doty with a clear partisan 
distinction. Returning to the “breakfast table analogy,” and in obvious refute of a statement made 
in an earlier Journal editorial “Burn that Coffee,” a supporter of Doty enthusiastically claimed, “I 
should not hesitate about having any of that coffee served at my own breakfast table.”xiii 
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 Later that day, another ship would arrive from Santos, The Roman Prince, which after it 
had been summarily detained for disinfection, brought the count of quarantined vessels anchored 
outside of the New York Harbor to three. As ships were expected to offload their cargo using 
lighters similar to the Taylor, Doty, having that day returned from Europe, surely saw the 
impending complications of continuing the quarantine indefinitely and sought to progress 
through more official means. As an ex-member of the Board of Health himself, Doty submitted 
to the Board for review a report that argued the Taylor should be permitted to land once the 
quarantine had concluded. Noticeable in the sponsorship of this report was Dr. Henry Geddings 
of the Marine Hospital Service. Having arrived in the days prior to report on the ship for the 
Surgeon General, he added to this support in his own official report which was delivered to the 
Surgeon General the next day on Nov. 29. After recounting the arrival and circumstance of the 
sick crew, Geddings extensively and in complimentary fashion, detailed Doty’s quarantine 
process, so far as to conclude, “I would beg to assure you that no possible precaution has been 
neglected… I firmly believe that the situation has been robbed of all of its dangers and that so far 
as the ship the J.W. Taylor is concerned, and any other of a similar nature from plague infected 
ports, no danger to the public health need be apprehended. It affords me great pleasure to be able 
to make this statement and to bear testimony to the courtesy which I have received at the hands 
of Dr. Doty and his assistants.”xiv 
The response from The Journal the following day was characteristically sensational, 
reiterating an old refrain with a new variation: “NOW BURN THAT COFFEE.” Statements from 
Dr. Cosby included in the article would be no less subtle, “No matter what happens, that coffee 
will not come into New York. We will take charge of the cargo as soon as it is released by the 
health officer of the port [Doty]. They can then take it back to Brazil or anywhere else, but it 
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can’t come in here. The owners may take legal action, but that is a matter for the future.”xv When 
asked for comment the Taylor’s shipping agents in New York, Busk & Jevons, replied “We shall 
have to submit to the Health Board’s decree. As to what we may do with the ship or cargo under 
the circumstances we do not care to state.”xvi The decree in particular which the statements 
mention, was the final and possibly grandest attempt by the Board of Health to decidedly bar the 
cargo of the Taylor from entering the city. Citing section 1210, of the Laws of 1897, the law 
titled “Putrid Cargoes May Be Destroyed,” read “the Board of Health, when it shall judge it 
necessary, may cause any cargo… or anything within the city that may be putrid or otherwise 
dangerous to the public health, to be destroyed or removed.”xvii As this effectively gave the 
Board authority to deny the landing of the Taylor, even after it had completed quarantine, the 
conflicting parties of the Board of Health and the Port New York, had reached a seemingly 
insurmountable difference of opinion in which neither side was willing to cede ground.  
Over the next four days, an unusual silence fell over the newspapers. As the Taylor, with 
its cargo unloaded into the surrounding lighters, floated uninhabited outside of the harbor, the 
day arrived on December 4, when Doty’s quarantine would end and the cargo would be released 
from quarantine. With this in mind, the agents of the Taylor, Busk & Jevons, quietly applied for 
the ship to be admitted to customs however the request was promptly denied. Whether of 
genuine concern or in an attempt to not lose public standing, Doty responded by conducting his 
own review of the quarantine, ruling that he would keep the ship under his personal watch until 
ready to be released, as rats or vermin may still be present in the cargo hold. Although Doty’s 
decision did not particularly advance or resolve the issue in any specific way, the presence of his 
remarks, in his usual platform The New York Times, perhaps motivated the Board of Health to 
release their own decision, that similar to Doty’s, was primarily an empty gesture in the face of 
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their intractable impasse. Despite the already failed attempt to admit the ship to customs, the 
Board of Health organized a police patrol to watch over the ship while Doty’s quarantine was 
officially lifted with orders to arrest anyone who attempted to board or captain the ship. As could 
be expected, no one was arrested that day. The New York Journal article which reported this 
patrol also included a small but significant segment with comments from the agents Busk & 
Jevons that would prove to become the new prevailing line of thinking in terms of resolving the 
quarantine of the Taylor.  
Challenging the Journal’s earlier economic arguments, the agents insisted that the refusal 
of the Board of Health to admit incoming ships would lead to a complete collapse of the import 
and coffee industry, stating, “it is useless to try to take that coffee to any other port, and the first 
storm that strikes it will ruin it where it is.”xviii Their point was underscored in the next day as 
two more ships arrived from Santos, both carrying cargo holds full of coffee. The steamers 
Lassel and Ragusa, similarly belonged to Busk & Jevons and despite having clean bills of health, 
the two were subjected to the same disinfecting procedures as the Taylor bringing the number of 
quarantined ships to five. In a decision, unusually critical of the Board of Health, The Journal led 
their December 4 article about the quarantine with a decisive summary of the of the total of value 
of coffee form Santos currently floating in the harbor, estimating its net worth to be close to one 
and a half million dollars, an enormous sum of money for the time. 
Three days later, when word arrived in New York that the President of the Boston Board 
of Health, Samuel S. Durgin, was willing to accept the shipments of quarantined coffee at his 
port, a mild panic broke out across the city. The Chamber of Commerce met immediately and 
issued a strong statement in support of Doty, detailing that “This Chamber expresses full 
confidence in the ability of the health officers of this port amply to protect the city and country 
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against the introduction of foreign infection and disease”xix To add to the mounting pressure on 
the Board of Health to acquiesce to Doty’s protocol, the next day’s Journal reported both the 
release of all crew members of the Taylor being kept at Swinburne and Hoffman Islands as well 
as a collision between the quarantined ships that were backing up outside of the harbor. The 
steamer Lassel, was hit in the congestion, and after losing a portion of its cargo due to damage, it 
managed to stabilize itself by immediately starting to offload its cargo to lighters. Later that day 
it was decided by The Coffee Exchange, a collection of leading local coffee entrepreneurs, to 
appoint a committee and appeal directly to President Murphy and the Board of Health. The 
dramatic meeting took place the following day, December 9, and according the New York 
Journal, “…resulted in nothing. President Murphy did most of the talking himself.”xx A 
particularly dramatic exchange between Doty and Murphy came when Murphy “discourse[d] 
learnedly and at length to the absorbent power of vegetable tissue. ‘Where did you learn all 
that?’ asked Dr. Doty? ‘Encyclopedia Britannica.’ Answered president Murphy. ‘Last edition 
published 1897.”xxi Nevertheless, Murphy’s single concession from the meeting, to meet with the 
board and consider the landing of healthy ships, was indicative of the many pressures being 
leveled against him. 
The pressure mounting against Murphy only grew after the meeting. The same day of the 
meeting with The Coffee Exchange, Medical News, a prominent medical journal of the period 
assessed the state of the quarantine and citing evidence recently published in The British Medical 
Journal, sided strongly with Doty’s procedure.xxii Two days later, on December 12, after two 
separate collisions occurred in the quarantine area—one including the Taylor, although no 
damage was done—Murphy was effectively left with little choice but to allow for the landing of 
the quarantined ships. Announced on December 13 and reported on December 14 in The New 
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York Times, The J.W. Taylor was replenished with its healthy crew and sailed for Queenstown, 
Maryland. The lighters loaded with coffee sailed to the Harbor of New York to be landed and 
immediately roasted by health officers. Ships arriving from infected ports now were subject to 
precautionary measures overseen by Doty and vessels that exhibited disease onboard were to be 
subjected to disinfection similar to that of the Taylor.xxiii The following day, in what marked the 
end of nearly a solid month of daily reporting on the Taylor, The New York Journal published its 
final editorial titled “On the Safe Side,” defending Murphy’s position. Recounting the 
devastations of plague in world history, the article strongly emphasized the sentiment of its title, 
repeatedly stressing that any cost of an extended quarantine, or turned-away ships, was favorable 
to the destruction the plague is capable of. Finally, in an impassioned personal defense of 
Murphy the Journal wrote, “The people who jeer at President Murphy may be extremely wise 
men. Perhaps they are right in saying that he is not a great bacteriologist. But if he is making a 
mistake, it is on the side of safety.”xxiv 
The legacy of the J.W. Taylor and its quarantine which pitted two early public health 
organizations against each other, can ultimately be viewed as a snapshot of the changing role and 
practice of public health in the early 20th century. The quarantine, which sought to prevent the 
spread of a lethal disease in an increasingly connected world, illuminated tensions at the heart of 
both the practice and ideology of public health in New York City at the turn of the century. In the 
grandest sense, the example of the Taylor also addresses a key question that has been central to 
the practice of public health throughout history: who gets to make decisions that affect the lives 
and well-being of a much larger group of people? In the case of the J.W. Taylor, both Dr. Doty 
and President Murphy were tasked with responding to multiple parts of society at once, weighing 
input from political, economic, social, and scientific communities. Although Doty’s protocol 
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eventually outlasted its opponents, and even inspired a degree of reform for processing 
international marine traffic, it did so with the help of immense pressure from market forces 
which had little regard for scientific understanding. In this sense, the quarantine prevailed as it 
was more responsive and transparent to the many societal inputs present in New York in 1899 
and 1900. Further, Doty’s quarantine served to effectively diminish his own agency, in the 
process creating new institutional standards and precedent, a trend that was consistent with the 
ongoing Progressive Era in American History. Contrasted with Murphy’s insistence on a 
significantly greater unilateral quarantine structure, despite his best intentions, the conflict may 
be interpreted as a symbolic confrontation between old and new understandings of public health. 
Moreover, Murphy’s position was equally as significant and necessary to the debate, as he 
consistently represented, even if dramatically so, the massive implications of what is at stake in 
public health implementation. Similarly, he provided a crucial critique of the structures that 
impacted the lives of all people living in the city, and forced both his opponents and the general 
public to contemplate the implications of their power. 
Two weeks after the departure of the J.W. Taylor, on New Year’s Eve Day, 1899, the 
Commissioners of Quarantine would present their annual report to the New York Assembly. In it 
they would detail the many proposed and necessary improvements needed at their quarantine 
centers at Swinburne and Hoffman Islands. Citing 1899 as the year with the highest number of 
quarantined subjects to date, they asked the assembly for funds to make the improvements.xxv A 
year later in 1900 they would submit nearly the exact same report asking for the same funds to 
make the same changes.xxvi Their difficulty obtaining funds to improve the quarantine system 
was not the only indication that public health was still beset by many of its past characteristics. 
On May 22, 1900 both the New York Times and Chicago Daily Tribune would report statements 
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made by President Murphy that the coffee from the J.W. Taylor had been roasted and secretly 
shipped to Chicago. Although by the date reported, the coffee would have already been 
consumed, the Chicago Board of Health was irate and promised a full investigation. There are no 
known records of the results of that investigation however what is known is that there was no 
major plague outbreak in Chicago. Reconsidering the prescient words of the New York Journal’s 
first scathing editorial, that “most people do not care to drink coffee from plague ships…” this 
final controversy, is fittingly characteristic of a narrative filled with arguments and accusations. 
Yet when considering the entire narrative of the Taylor, what is more noticeable and significant 
than any concluding controversy itself, is how this decisive ambiguity finally highlights the 
realization of Dr. A.H. Doty’s plan. Given the sensational and dramatic nature of the J.W. 
Taylor’s arrival in New York, this final silence in the ship’s history is arguably the single 
strongest argument both for the successful quarantine of the J.W. Taylor, and ultimately, the 
evolution of public health at the turn of the century. 
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